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As 1888 drew to a close, John Montgomery Ward stood atop the world of profes-
sional baseball. The star shortstop 
had just led the New York Giants 
to the National League pennant, fol-
lowed by a triumph over the St. Louis 
Browns of the rival American Asso-
ciation in what even then went by 
the inflated title of baseball’s “World 
Series.” A dominating pitcher early 
in his career (he threw the second 
perfect game in major league his-
tory), an arm injury forced Ward 
to recreate himself as an infielder, 
where he became one of the best 
fielders and hitters of his era. He was 
lauded in the press as a ballplayer 
with “few equals and no superiors,” 
and “by long odds the most popu-
lar player in the profession.” These 
accomplishments would eventually 
earn Ward a place in the Baseball 
Hall of Fame.
Ward’s skills on the ball field were 
only a part of what made him such a 
remarkable figure. Contemporaries 
and historians alike have struggled to 
describe him. One adjective-happy 
biographer took the saturation ap-
proach: he was a “jug-eared, willowy, 
peach-fuzzed, overreaching punk” 
as well as “honorable, smart, and te-
nacious.” More admired than liked 
seems to have been the consensus 
view of Ward contemporaries. In a 
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Photo of John Montgomery Ward, 1922, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.
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profession not known for intellectu-
alism, he stood out. Although Ward 
left school at the age of thirteen in 
order to pursue his baseball career, 
he eventually earned, in his spare 
time, degrees in political science and 
law from Columbia. He was said to 
speak five languages. A regular con-
tributor to newspapers and periodi-
cals, in 1888 he published Baseball: 
How to Become a Player, which he 
described as a “handbook of the 
game, a picture of the play as seen by 
a player.”
Ward was also a pioneering labor 
leader. In 1885, he established Amer-
ica’s first sports union, the Broth-
erhood of Professional Base Ball 
Players. Initially designed to help 
sick, injured, or hard-up ballplayers 
and promote professional standards, 
the Brotherhood quickly evolved 
into something approaching a craft 
union for ballplayers. Ward had for-
ward-looking attitudes on race as 
well. At a time when the color line 
was hardening in American society, 
and organized baseball had become 
a whites-only affair, Ward urged the 
Giants to sign an African-American 
pitcher.
If all this wasn’t enough, Ward’s 
social life was also noteworthy. In 
1887 he married a New York actress 
and socialite, Helen Dauvray, who 
also happened to be a passionate 
baseball fan. “Her tiny hands beat 
each other rapturously at every vic-
tory of the Giants and her dark eyes 
were bedewed at every defeat,” re-
ported the New York Times. “But 
the thousands of spectators who ob-
served Miss Dauvray’s emotions lit-
tle suspected that one of the Giants 
had any precedence over the others 
so far as her affections were con-
cerned.” She had donated the Tiffany 
trophy that went to the World Series 
champion; it was the “Dauvray Cup” 
that her husband brought home at 
the end of the 1888 season. In How 
to Become a Player, the ever gallant 
Ward included a chapter explaining 
the basics of the game “for the ben-
efit of those ladies whose escorts ei-
ther cannot, or will not, answer their 
questions.” He also offered advice for 
his gentleman readers: “Whoever 
has not experienced the pleasure of 
taking a young lady to her first game 
of ball should seize the first opportu-
nity to do so.”
Life was not all three-hit games 
and celebrity life for the great Mon-
te Ward, however. His relationship 
with Helen Dauvray was strained 
almost from the start. He was carry-
ing on an affair, and she knew it; she 
wanted to return to the stage, and he 
didn’t want her to. They lived togeth-
er for only a year and soon divorced.
His baseball career too was about 
to veer off in some unexpected direc-
tions. Following his World Series tri-
umph, Ward captained a team of Na-
tional League all-stars that traveled 
around the globe between October 
1888 and April 1889 in an effort to 
promote the game overseas. It was a 
grand gesture, fitting for an emerg-
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ing era of American nationalism 
and confidence on the international 
scene. But the world tour also helped 
set in motion one of the most signif-
icant upheavals in baseball’s history. 
The man who organized and led the 
tour around the globe was Albert 
Goodwill Spalding. Soon after they 
returned home, he and Ward would 
face off in an epic struggle for the fu-
ture of the game.
Spalding, a star pitcher in his 
younger years, now owned the Chi-
cago White Stockings of the Na-
tional League in addition to a bur-
geoning sporting goods empire. The 
game never had a more effective and 
more passionate salesman. Baseball, 
he once wrote, captured the nation 
because “it is the exponent of Amer-
ican Courage, Confidence, Combat-
iveness; American Dash, Discipline, 
Determination; American Energy, 
Eagerness, Enthusiasm; American 
Pluck, Persistency, Performance; 
American Spirit, Sagacity, Success; 
American Vim, Vigor, Virility.” 
(Spalding also basically created base-
ball’s all-American birth myth, which 
conveniently featured a future Civil 
War hero, Abner Doubleday, in 1839 
dreaming up the game in bucolic 
Cooperstown, New York. In fact, 
baseball had largely evolved from 
various children’s games; if it ever 
had a proper birth moment, it was 
among young professionals in 1840s 
New York City.) Spalding envisioned 
the world tour as an opportunity to 
sell two things he loved above all: 
the game of baseball and the equip-
ment that bore his name. Despite his 
background as a player, and despite 
his overwrought romanticism about 
the national pastime, Spalding ap-
proached his role as a team owner 
from the perspective of the captain 
of industry that he had become: the 
players were employees, and com-
fortably paid ones at that; and it was 
the owner’s job to control costs and 
ensure a compliant workforce. Need-
less to say, he didn’t think much of 
Ward’s efforts with the Brotherhood.
John M. Ward, New York Giants baseball card por-
trait, 1887, Library of Congress. Facing: Photo of 
Albert Goodwill Spalding, 1910, Bain Collection, 
Library of Congress.
Christopher W. Schmidt 47
The world tour had just reached Cairo, Egypt, in February 1889 
when the players received news that, 
at their winter meetings in New 
York, the National League owners 
had adopted a major reform de-
signed to reign in player salaries. 
They created a player classification 
system under which “Class A” play-
ers earned $2,500, “Class B” players 
$2,250, and so on, down to “Class E” 
players who earned $1,500. The clas-
sifications scheme took into account 
not only player ability, but also “con-
duct, both on and off the field.”
Ward, who had already estab-
lished himself as his generation’s 
most outspoken critic of baseball’s 
distinctive labor practices, saw the 
plan as an affront to the players. 
What made working as a profes-
sional ballplayer different from any 
other occupation was the “reserve 
clause,” a provision in player con-
tracts under which an owner could 
“reserve” a number of players when 
the term of their contracts ended. 
The clause prohibited the player 
from negotiating with another team 
unless his team released him. As 
professional baseball was controlled 
by an agreement between the teams 
under which each team agreed to 
respect the player contracts of oth-
er teams, the reserved player faced 
three options: sign a new contract 
at the terms dictated by the owner; 
hold out and hope for better terms; 
or stop playing baseball. Owners 
defended the reserve clause as es-
sential to ensuring the stability of 
the game. It did indeed further this 
goal. But there was another reason, 
one they didn’t trumpet so proud-
ly: it kept down player salaries. And 
here too it was effective. In the late 
1880s, as club profits tripled, player 
salaries grew by only 30 percent, a 
fact at least partly attributable to the 
reserve system.
In 1887, Ward had a scathing at-
tack on the reserve clause, titled “Is 
the Base-Ball Player a Chattel?” He 
compared the reserve clause to “a fu-
gitive-slave law”: it “denies [the play-
er] a harbor or a livelihood, and car-
ries him back, bound and shackled, 
to the club from which he attempted 
to escape.” The remedy, according to 
Ward, was simple: get rid of “base-
ball law” and allow “the business of 
base-ball to be made to rest on the 
ordinary business basis.”
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress48
When he learned of the owners’ 
classification plan, Ward was so in-
censed he threatened to abandon the 
world tour to come home and con-
front the owners.  (The news that the 
Giants were trying to trade him only 
added to his frustration.) He sus-
pected that Spalding had planned the 
entire trip just to get him and some 
of his allies out of the country in or-
der to go forward with their plans. 
If this was indeed Spalding’s plan 
(and there is no evidence it was), it 
backfired, as the tour ended up giv-
ing some of the game’s top players 
long hours to share their grievances. 
The plan for the baseball revolution 
that would upend the game in 1890 
might very well have been hatched 
in quiet conversation among the 
players while on Spalding’s world 
tour. Nearly all the players on the 
tour would join Ward’s revolt against 
the National League.
During the 1889 season, Ward 
began preparations for the creation 
of a rival major league, the Players 
League. Working in secret (he was, 
after all, still on the enemy’s payroll), 
he found financial backing and con-
vinced many of his fellow players 
to commit to the new league. Some 
aspects of the Players League looked 
familiar. The players were famil-
iar—the new league lured many of 
the best National League players to 
its rosters. And the cities in which 
they played were familiar—the sev-
en cities in which their eight teams 
played were all cities that already 
had National League teams. But the 
business model behind the Players 
League was radically different from 
anything that had come before. 
Each club was run by an eight-man 
board, consisting of four players and 
four investors. The league was gov-
erned by a senate-like organization, 
with two representatives from each 
team (one elected by players, one by 
owners). Players had three-year con-
tracts, and no reserve clause. Inves-
tors were promised the first $10,000 
of each club’s net profit, with the rest 
to be divided among the players.
Spalding and the National League 
attacked the Players League. First, 
they turned to the courts: the Giants 
sued Ward for breach of contract. 
Ward had violated the terms of his 
reserve clause, they claimed, and 
they asked a New York state court 
to issue an injunction prohibiting 
Ward from playing for anyone else. 
The court denied the injunction. As 
the reserve clause failed to specify 
such essentials as Ward’s salary and 
the terms of the renewed contract, 
the judge concluded that it was too 
indefinite to be treated as a bind-
ing contract for the 1890 season. 
The court also raised the disturbing 
question of whether, assuming the 
reserve clause were read to consti-
tute a binding contract for the fol-
lowing season, the renewed contract 
would also include a reserve clause. 
If so, the player would be tied to his 
current team for as long as the team 
desired, while the team could release 
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a player with only 10 days’ notice.
This was rather absurd, according 
to the judge. “We have the spectacle 
presented of a contract which binds 
one party for a series of years and 
the other party for 10 days, and of 
the party who is itself bound for ten 
days coming into a court of equity to 
enforce its claims against the party 
bound for years.” The judge conclud-
ed that the reserve clause was unen-
forceable for “want of fairness and of 
mutuality.”
With the courts refusing to help, 
Spalding turned to public opinion. 
He pulled out all the rhetorical stops. 
What the players were doing was 
“secession,” a “revolt,” a “war”; the 
National League was confronting 
“hot headed anarchists” who were 
leading a “revolutionary movement.”
But the fall of the Players League 
after just one season came not from 
Spalding’s attacks in the press, nor 
from legal challenges. It came from 
the marketplace. The new league 
had the best players, but this was not 
enough. With three major leagues 
competing for a limited fan base, 
everyone suffered at the gate. At 
season’s end, when Spalding opened 
negotiations with Players League in-
vestors, he pointedly excluded Ward 
and any other players. “[T]he mon-
ied men met with the monied men,” 
as Spalding put it. The National League 
owners simply bought out their 
competition; several Players League 
clubs were integrated into a recon-
figured National League. Ward’s rev-
olution was over.
Ward returned to the National 
League, where he played four more 
seasons. He was still one of the best 
players in the league when he retired 
in 1894. He went on to be a success-
ful lawyer, a gentleman farmer, and 
a top amateur golfer. Although he 
mended fences with organized base-
ball, his passion for the cause he had 
led never left him. In 1925, shortly 
before his death, he gave a speech—
at an event to celebrate the National 
League, of all places—recounting 
the events of 1888–1890 in which he 
made clear that the war against the 
National League, while doomed, was 
justified.
For a brief moment, the Players League presented a radical al-
ternative business model for profes-
sional sports, one in which the play-
ers and owners shared control of the 
game as well as its profits. With the 
failure of Ward’s baseball revolution, 
the owner-dominated system lived 
on. In the following decades, various 
teams would go to court to have the 
reserve clause enforced against play-
ers who had jumped their contracts 
(a relatively common occurrence 
any time there was a rival league that 
refused to abide by the agreement 
that controlled the baseball monop-
oly). Judges, with only the rarest of 
exceptions, sided with the players, 
often citing Ward’s case as authori-
ty on the matter. The reserve clause 
lived on, however, and it did so be-
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cause the baseball monopoly, while 
periodically challenged, remained in 
place. As long as owners respected 
the contracts of their on-the-field 
competitors, they did not need the 
courts. For this reason, the most 
significant legal challenges to base-
ball’s unique labor practices came in 
the realm of antitrust, not contract 
law. But baseball law survived this 
challenge too, as the United States 
Supreme Court granted, and then 
twice reaffirmed, that federal anti-
trust law did not apply to profession-
al baseball.
When change eventually came in 
the 1970s, it was at the hands of an-
other organized players movement, 
but this time it was achieved not 
through a rival league but through 
labor negotiations (with a critical as-
sist from a sympathetic arbiter). To-
day, major league baseball operates 
in a way that has some similarities 
to the core premise of the alternative 
model Ward had offered. The game 
is governed, in large part, through 
collective bargaining agreements be-
tween players and owners. With the 
skyrocketing of player salaries after 
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the fall of the reserve clause, the game’s 
profits are far more evenly distrib-
uted between players and owners. 
It took almost a century, but John 
Montgomery Ward’s vision for ma-
jor league baseball has, in some part, 
been realized. ◆
